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Lucas Heights revisited: The framing of
a major scientific controversy by the
Sydney Morning Herald

AdamLucas
Abstract
A detailed analysis of the Sydney Morning Heral<fs reportage of the
Lucas Heights controversy reveals significant omissions in that coverage. In particular, I draw attention to the existence of two competing
rationalities within the controversy, that is, the instrumental rationality used by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), the Australian Federal Government, and the SMH
editorial to publicly justify the building of a new reactor, and the
ecological rationality advocated by the Sutherland Shire Council's scientific consultants and some individuals within the environmental
lobby. I further argue that the full ramifications ofthe SMH's reportage
ofthis controversy cannot be understood without reference to a number
of international trade and diplomacy issues which have not been raised
in the context of that reportage. I suggest that, because the SMH
editorial shares the same instrumental approach to social and political
issues as the Federal Government and ANSTO, the power relations at
work within the Lucas Heights controversy have remained obscured by
the positivistic belief in the social and political neutrality of technical
evidence. Inasmuch as such a critique can be extended to the rest ofthe
Australian media, the likelihood of implementing a more ecological
approach to the reportage of scientific and technological development in
Australia appears remote.

Introduction
The following discussion focuses upon the continuing controversy
surrounding the High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR) nuclear research reactor at Lucas Heights in the south-west of Sydney and, in
Adam Lucas is a postgraduate student in the School of Science and Technology Studies at the
University ofNew South Wales. Sydney. New South Wales.
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particular, the manner in which this controversy has been handled by
one ofAustralia's major daily newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald,
now owned by Conrad Black, Malcolm Turnbull, and Kerry Packer's
Fairfax Group. My discussion concentrates on the SMH's reportage of
some of the most recent developments in the controversy, particularly
between June and November 1993.
The substantive claim made in this paper is that the IDFAR reactor
at Lucas Heights is simply one element in a much larger matrix of
conflicting but interrelated social, political, and economic interests
which have remained largely concealed from public scrutiny. An unfolding of the SMH's coverage ofLucas Heights, together with an articulation of the issues revealed, throws considerable light on those
conflicting interests. The intention ofthis analysis is to identif'y general
pattems of reporting, and the extent to which individual articles have
incorporated the discursive methodologies and underlying rationalities
represented by the different interests involved.
Certainty and optimism verSUS incredulity and pessimism: Conflicting rhetorics or conflicting rationalities?
Gissing (1993) recently identified two rhetorics as operative in the
Lucas Heights controversy: the rhetoric of certainty and optimism used
by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) in its attempts to justif'y the building of a new research reactor,
and the rhetoric of incredulity and pessimism used by the Sutherland
Shire Council and the environmental lobby, which oppose both a new
reactor and ANSTO's radioactive storage and safety procedures. However, while there is some truth to Gissing's observations, it would
appear on closer examination that the rhetoric underscoring the conflict
is motivated by two incommensurable scientific' rationalities, each of
which constructs the notion of scientific and technical evidence in a
totally different fashion, and each of which promotes apparently apposite social objectives.
The (positivistic) instrumental rationality advocated by ANSTO and
its public representatives in the government and the media contrast
with the (process-oriented) ecological rationality advocated by the Sutherland Shire Council's scientific consultants and some individuals
within the environmental lobby. To the best of my knowledge, this
difference in scientific rationalities has not been identified in any ofthe
contemporary analyses of scientific controversies in the media, although it is an empirically demonstrable difference.
The term 'instrumental rationality', or 'instrumental reason', derives
from the work of the Frankfurt School (Adomo, 1960; Adomo & Horkheimer, 1972; Habermas, 1979; 1980). It is identified with a form of
rationality known as positivism, which has gradually expanded its
influence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries so that it
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now provides a theoretical basis for the majority ofwhat Habermas has
called the empirical-analytical sciences, as well as many of the modern
approaches to social theory (McCarthy, 1978). Its central assumption is
that the social sciences should model themselves on the natural sciences, whose modus operandi is the only one thought capable ofproducing certifiable and therefore valid knowledge.
Developing a critique of reason derived from Kant and Weber, the
Frankfurt School made a sharp distinction between 'instrumental reason' and what they called 'practical reason'. Practical reason is the form
of rationality developed by ordinary people in the practical application
of shared knowledge in everyday life, and is oriented towards the ideals
of freedom, justice, and happiness. Instrumental reason, on the other
hand, derives mainly from the mechanistic worldview of the natural
sciences. Its systematic aim is the technical control and domination of
nature (including human nature), expressed by capitalism in the ubiq~
uity of commodity exchange, and 'a continually refined administration
of human beings and their relations to each other by means of social
organization' (Habermas, 1973, p. 254).
Whereas Adomo and Horkheimer saw instrumental rationality as a
distorted form of reason, a 'negative dialectic', that could/should be
replaced by a 'new science' which acknowledges the equal status of
practical reason and other forms of rationality (Adomo, 1982, pA8 ff;
Horkheimer, 1972), Habermas has chosen to preserve the hermeneutic
distinction between what he calls the 'critical sciences' and the (positivistic) social and natural sciences, but points to the different interests
implicit in each of the forms of rationality that are considered appropriate to them (Habermas, 1975). Accordingly, the notion of a 'new science'
and a new form of rationality which could bridge the divide is precluded
as a possibility by Habermas (McCarthy, 1978). Thus, Habermas argues
that instrumental, or what he calls system rationality is applied appropriately within the empirical-analytical sciences, but that it should
remain within that domain of 'communicative action', rather than
'colonisint the other domains which constitute the 'lifeworld'. We can
thus get some idea of how different members of the Frankfurt School
have regarded the notion that instrumental rationality constitutes the
legitimating ideology of the advanced industrialised nations (Dunn,
1979, p. 343).
Although postmodernists such as Lyotard and the poststructuralist
Foucault have attempted to problematise such a description, it is not
difficult to demonstrate that the globalisation of instrumental rationality has proceeded without interruption since the late 1970s (Debord,
1990; Guattari & Negri, 1990). Lyotard's assertion in 1979 that 'the
Trilateral Commission is not a popular pole ofattraction' (Lyotard, 1987,
p.14) now appears somewhat premature, given the ever-expanding
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influence of monetarist policies and economic rationalism as populist
ideologies. The instrumental goals promised by such an approach have
been embraced by government after government in the positivistic belief
that the prescriptions of neo-classical quantitative economics are the
only solution for our social and economic ills. Those postmodemists who
point to the disunity of this Spectacle have fallen victim to its deceptive
representations (Debord, 1990).
While the positivistic social and natural sciences represent themselves as the only means of acquiring 'true' or 'objective' knowledge,
there is a stark contrast between this ideal self-image and the way in
which such knowledge is actually accumulated and applied in the
practicalities of the workplace (Collingridge & Reeve, 1986; Gilbert &
Mulkay, 1984; Rip, 1985; Wynne, 1987). Wynne argues that science and
technology operating within the positivist framework do so through a
process of rule-construction and rule-following, 'where previous experience of rule-operation is extended to new situations by the od hoc
addition of new rules or sub-rules, in an ever-accumulating practical
"craft" tradition' (Wynne, 1988, p. 154). Wynne points out that although
positivist methodologies routinely incorporate notions ofacceptable risk
and uncertainty through the application ofrules ofthumb and other soft
models (that is, non-quantitative, or a mixture of qualitative and quantitative models), more often than not, the representation of these methodologies to the public is through the filtering lens of a certainty based
on supposedly indisputable technical criteria.
Nevertheless, science is not monolithic. Although there is a long
history of opposition to positivistic approaches in social theory, and to
mechanism within the 'natural' sciences, it is only over the last 30 years
that this has translated into a popular movement of opposition to
positivistic approaches amongst scientists and technologists from a
broad range ofdisciplines. Habermas (1980) makes the observation that
responsible scientists, disregarding their professional or official roles, cross
the boundaries of their inner scientific world and address themselves
directly to public opinion when they want either to avert practical oonsequences oonnected with the choice of specific technologies or to criticize
specific research investments in terms oftheir social effects (p. 79).
From these 'small beginnings', the process ofbroadening the dialogue
between scientific and technical consultants, government agencies, and
the general public has progressed considerably. What has not been
well-recognised, however, is that there is no consensus within the
scientific community about the superiority of instrumental approaches
to science and technology. Consequently, we see a clash of competing
scientific and technical claims made, on the one hand, by those 'responsible' scientists and engineers motivated by an interest in expanding
the resources and methodologies open to science, and on the other, by
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those primarily motivated by the desire to preserve the authority and
ideological legitimacy of positivistic forms of science in the face of
increasing calls for democratic participation in the direction of scientific
and technological development.
Through this conflict of competing scientific and technical claims
within scientific and environmental controversies, it is possible to locate
ecological rationality as an emergent form of scientific rationality, and
even to assert that the emergent ecological rationality is coextensive
with the efforts of certain 'responsible' scientists to identify a 'new
science'. Certain ideas and approaches which would be fundamental to
such a 'new science' can also be seen as constituting this emergent
ecological rationality, that is:
(a) Scientific activity conforms to heterogeneous paradigms oftheory
and methodology which are collectively maintained and transformed (Feyerabend, 1986; Kuhn, 1970). Whether we subject
these paradigms to a logical, historical, empirical, or hermeneutic
analysis, it can be demonstrated that each paradigm has a domain of applicability, which means that there are, of necessity,
limits to any particular scientific approach. Scientific knowledge
can therefore be seen as context-dependent, provisional, and open
to varying degrees of uncertainty. The conception of an ecology of
'regional', intersecting, complementary, and/or competing rationalities, of which any given paradigm is a subset, is more consistent with this multidisciplinary perspective than is the conception of one universal rationality (see Hayles, 1991; Lulunann,
1989 for two different theoretical perspectives on this issue).
(b) The collective process of constituting scientific knowledge necessarily involves scientists in an ongoing process of education, peer
negotiation, experimentation, and interpretation, which in turn
involves the application ofvalue-judgements based on metaphysical, ethical, and/or technical criteria (Collingridge & Reeve, 1986;
Edge, 1985; Jasanoff, 1987; Wynne, 1988). Whether or not they
are made explicit, social and political objectives are always embodied within these criteria (Albury, 1988). Those who make
claims for the social and political neutrality of science are therefore misgnided (Bloor, 1981; Latour, 1986).
(c) The empirical-analytical sciences are thus neither asocial nor
apolitical. Nor are they reducible to a logically self-consistent
body of knowledge, or a single, rational methodology. The classical models of natural and social order cherished by positivism
should remain restricted to the most simple and predictable
natural phenomena to which they were initially applied. More
complex natural and social phenomena require the evolution of
more flexible and sophisticated mathematical tools, scientific
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theories, and methodologies, and can usefully incorporate local
and/or indigenous knowledge of the problem at issue (Feyerabend, 1988; Latour, 1986; Lucas, 1993; Wynne, 1988, 1989).
A critique of the instrumental and ecological rationalities employed
by some of the dominant players in the Lucas Heights controversy
underpins my analysis of articles in the 8MB. Before conducting this
analysis, however, it is necessary to describe how a number of instrumental goals pursued by the Australian Federal Government have
played an important, though hitherto largely neglected, role in the
Lucas Heights controversy. An explication of these issues reveals that
the strategic manoeuvring required to achieve these goals is directly
related to international trade and diplomacy issues, and that the Lucas
Heights controversy cannot be understood without taking these matters into consideration.

Nuclear development in Asia and the Pacific region
According to some contemporary political theorists, the long-term
strategy of capitalism and/or socialism is to replace a recalcitrant and
'overpaid' manufacturing workforce in the developed nations with nonunionised, cheap manufacturing labour in Asia and Latin America; hence
the need to build more factories and boost the production base as quickly
as possible in those regions (Giddens, 1986; Guattari & Negri, 1990).
Within this expansion of the world's manufacturing sector into Asia
in particular, part of the expected pay-offfor the industrialised nations
is, firstly, the sale of technical know-how to Asia, and, secondly, for
those governments and corporations with access to the raw materials
for energy production, export contracts for the supply of oil, coal,
natural gas, and uranium for the expanding energy needs of Asia's
newly industrialised nations.
The Australian Federal Government has not been slow to perceive
this 'window of opportunity'. Whilst it has downplayed the regular
transgression of human rights by some Asian states (N-waste is negative, 1993, June 29), it has simultaneously attempted to expand its
trade with those countries. Hence, Prime Minister Paul Keating's visit
to Indonesia shortly after the last federal election in 1993, which was
aimed at strengthening economic ties between the two nations, and,
according to television reports at the time, included discussions between Keating and Indonesian officials about plans for a dozen new
nuclear power reactors in the region. Although Keating's visit was given
some attention on the television and radio news at the time, it was not
reported in the 8MH, nor was it reported in The Australian. Nor was
Keating's visit to Indonesia mentioned in any of the three subsequent
laudatory articles about Indonesia which appeared in the 8MB in the

78

Australian Journd ofCommunimtWn, Vol. 21 (3), 1994

following fortnight after that visit (Australia's success in Indonesia,
1993, March 14; Soeharto takes new tack,1993, March 22; Indonesia:
taking the long view, 1993, March 24), a fact which suggests that the
SMH editorial may intentionally not have published anything about
that visit. If the suppression of information surrounding the Keating
visit was a deliberate strategy, it raises extremely serious questions
about the independence of the SMHs news coverage of such an important and controversial issue. It is perhaps no accident that the SMHs
sudden enthusiasm for Indonesia followed on directly from both the
1993 Federal Election, and the highly controversial 'deal' struck between Keating and Conrad Black over the latter's access to a larger
share percentage of the Fairfax Group. Was a softer editorial line on
Indonesia also part ofthat deal?
An article from four months before the election helps shed some more
light on this perplexing issue. On 18 November 1992, in an article
entitled 'Indonesia puts off Canberra N-deal', it was revealed by the
SMHs Indonesian correspondent, Lindsay Murdoch, that the Indonesian Government had just refused to sign 'a nuclear co-operation agreement [with Australia] which foreshadowed the sale of uranium for
planned nuclear power reactors on Java'. It was revealed in the report
that Indonesia's Minister for Research and Development, Dr B. J.
Habibie, had 'declined to sign the proposed Australia-Indonesia Nuclear
Science and Technology Co-operation Agreement during a meeting with
the Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce, Senator Button'
(Murdoch, 1992). Habibie's refusal to sign was reportedly due to the fact
that he was unaware that the agreement 'which officials from both
countries had been preparing for almost two years, was one of several
to be signed by the two countries at the first Australia-Indonesia
Ministerial Forum' (Murdoch, 1992). Button said that Habibie had
refused to sign because he 'wanted to put nuclear co-operation under the
broader umbrella of a joint agreement on science and technology', and
that Button 'hoped it could be approved by early next year' (Murdoch,
1992). 'Early next year' was precisely the time that Keating was in
Indonesia.
My earlier contention - that the HIFAR reactor at Lucas Heights is
merely one element in a much larger matrix of conflicting but interrelated interests - is further supported by the fact that the proposed
nuclear co-operation agreement between Australia and Indonesia
would allow personnel and technical exchanges between ANSTO and
Indonesia's nuclear agency, Batan. It would cover 'the running of research reactors, radiation technology in medicine and industry, the
management of radioactive waste and radiation safety' (Murdoch,
1992). It was also reported that 'the agreement signalled future sales of
Australian uranium to Indonesia' (Murdoch, 1992).
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Another article by Dr Clive Hamilton, former Research Director for
the Resource Assessment Commission, published in the 8MH on the 30
August 1993, confirms that Indonesia's plans for the first of twelve
reactors, to be built close to an 'extinct' volcano in one of the most
seismica1ly active places on earth, were going ahead; the final decision
being whether or not to contract Mitsubishi or Westinghouse for the job.
Hamilton also confirmed that '[t]he Australian Government, lured by
the prospect of uranium sales, is due to sign a nuclear co-<lperation
agreement with Indonesia that will give unequivoeal endorsement to
Indonesia's plans' (Hamilton, 1993).
These two articles, together with another by Armitage (1992), are the
only articles over the last four years to even allude to the fact that these
secret negotiations have been taking place. It would therefore appear
that those 8MH journalists who could have made more of this story
have so effectively internalised the value system of their organisation
that they have no difficnlty in ignoring potentially explosive news
items. It wonld seem that it is largely unnecessary for today's media
managers to suppress this kind of information when they have such
compliant journalistic staff. Although this story has been reported
(while Keating's Indonesian visit was not), it is the number oftimes the
story has been reported, and how much attention it is given, that
determines whether or not the issue in question enters the public
consciousness at a sufficient order of magnitude to effect a public (and
therefore, a political) response.

ANSTO and the 'national interest' argument
For some years now, ANSTO has been lobbying the Federal Government for the building of a replacement of the research reactor HIFAR,
built in the late 1950s and operational from 1958. The cost of a new
reactor has been quoted at anything from $150-600 million (Catalano,
1993; Cook, 1992; Macey, 1993a; Phelan, Plibersek, & Dodd, 1991;
Pockley, 1993a). Opposition to the building of a new reactor from local
residents, the Sutherland Shire Council, environmental groups, and
State and Federal Members of Parliament has resulted in a temporary
suspension ofthese plans. The Federal Government's Research Reactor
Review, which was formally constituted sometime around 22 December
1992 (Pockley, 1992), recommended that the decision to build a new
reactor should be postponed for another five years when it handed down
its findings on 5 August 1993, thus 'allowing time for the technical and
commercial arguments to become clearer' (Macey, 1993b). On the 9
November 1993, Parliament voted to support this finding.
While ANSTO argued its case to the Federal Government on the basis
that a new reactor and extended nuclear program would further
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Australia's 'national interest', it sought to justify its case to the public
on the grounds that it would be economically advantageous for Australia because of the increased production of radioisotopes for nuclear
medicine, and other research efforts (ANSTO, 1993).
Indeed, the only occasions on which the national interest argument has
been raised publicly, at least with respect to the SMHs reporting of it,
was in a series ofthree editorials written by Hickie dated 11 June, 22 July,
and 6 August 1993 (Hickie, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). The only time this
argument was made explicit by Hickie, however, was on the day that the
Research Reactor Review's findings were made public on 6 August, 1993.
It is worth quoting the final two paragraphs of Hickie's editorial, titled
'Maybe is not an answer', which continues the line taken in his earlier two
editorials, supporting ANSTO's call for the building of a new reactor.
Although Hickie does not dispute the committee's finding that any
new reactor could not be financially self-supporting, he believes that the
medical and research uses of such a reactor, combined with the national
interest argument, do in fact justify the building of a new reactor:
We live in a region where the rapidly increasing demand for power is
being met in large part by new nuclear power stations. Virtually every
sizeable country in South-East Asia is planning them. (Indonesia, for
example, has plans for twelve.) This will involve potential problems with
which everyone is familiar: the handling of intractable waste, pollution,
the possible spread of nuclear weapons. If our voice is to be heard clearly
overseas, ifwe are to be informed effectively ofcurrent developments, and
if we are to have expertise readily available to deal with the problems
which arise, a nuclear installation is necessary to keep Australian nuclear
science alive, and maintain our membership of the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
That alone does not justify spending $250 million [sicl, but together with
the medical and research uses of a reactor, it does (Hickie, 1993c).
Thus, we can see that Hickie does not question the validity of any of
the arguments put forward by ANSTO to support the building of a new
reactor. In fact, he is merely reiterating the line taken by the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, who claims that Australia
needs a nuclear reactor ifit is to continue to have a say on international
nuclear policies (Lagan, 1993), which is simply fallacious (Greenpeace,
1993; Sutherland Shire Council, 1993b, pp. 50-51). Hickie's reasoning
is therefore problematic. Rather than asserting Australia's role in
questioning the proliferation of nuclear technology within the Asian
region, he merely acknowledges that such proliferation is occurring, and
that Australia, ifit is to have any voice in this debate, must continue its
own nuclear reactor program. Any possible alternatives have been
foreclosed from his discussion. Hickie's editorial is therefore ideologically constrained by his unquestioning acceptance of the terms of the
debate set by ANSTO, which he assures us is sufficiently expert and
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professional to put forward an unbiased assessment of its own needs.
Such unquestioning faith in scientific expertise (and government 'wisdom') raises an important issue with regard to the legitimacy of the
scientific claims made by professional (and often government-sponsored) scientific research organisations when protecting or furthering
their own (generally positivistic) research interests through the media.

The 8MB, Lucas Heights, and scientific claims
Ofthe twenty-five articles published in the SMHbetween 1 June and
31 July 1993 which dealt with the controversy surrounding a possible
new reactor, ouly a third of them deal in any way with the actual
scientific claims made by ANSTO and/or the Sutherland Shire Council.
Ofthese nine articles, ouly five actually deal with such scientific claims
in any detail, and ouly four of them with any critical sense brought to
bear. Four of the other five articles merely report the claims of ANSTO
and the 'scientific' information which it has supplied journalists (Nwaste test is negative, 1993, June 29; Browne, 1993; Hickie, 1993a; Zuel
& Connell, 1993). These four articles reinforce the instrumental view of
scientific activity which ANSTO has sought to maintain. The other
article, by Pockley, is constructed in the manner of a balanced report,
but obfuscates certain criticisms which have been levelled at ANSTO
(Pockley, 1993b).
The only four articles from this period that deal with the scientific
claims regarding Lucas Heights with anything approaching journalistic
objectivity were written by Danielle Cook, the SMlfs local government
and, formerly, environmental, reporter. Three of these articles actually
put forward the alternative scientific claims being made by the Sutherland Shire Council. Significantly, this is the first and only time that the
SMHhas reported the controversy in this way, although it is not the first
and only time that scientific research commissioned by the Sutherland
Shire Council has been brought to bear within the debate (Robertson &
Chambers, 1993; Sutherland Shire Council, 1993a, 1993b).
The Sutherland Shire Council's scientific claims, as reported in two
of Cook's articles, can be summarised as follows:

Article 1
The risk of a major accident at Lucas Heights has been underestimated by ANSTO by up to 1000 times compared with estimates
for two similar reactors in the United States, according to information supplied by the Californian-based energy and environmental
consultants MHB Technical Associates (Cook, 1993a).
ANSTO's safety procedures are severely lacking, that is, with
regard to ANSTO's emergency plan:
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evacuation ofresidents would not occur until they had been exposed to
100 times the maximum permissible dose ofradiation ... ANSTO does
not propose to advise the evacuation of residents until it is almost
certsin that 15 in every 1000 people exposed to a cloud of radioactive
particles will eventually die of cancer from that exposure ... This is
based on the conclusion that 90 per cent of the people exposed to
radioactivity will be inside at the time, and that ouly 1 per cent of the
radioactive material in the reactor core will be released (Cook, 1993a).
Article 2
Radioactive waste discharges from Lucas Heights are 'extraordinarily high' - especially those discharges that are made into the
air. These claims were made by Mr John Large, senior partner and
nuclear engineer with the London-based consultancy Large and
Associates, who stated in his submission to the Research Reactor
Review that,
[t]he ANSTO environmental monitoring program is poorly planned
and of an ad hoc nature ... In some instances crucial radioactive
pathways have not been monitored since the early 1980s ... and there
is the overriding and quite erroneous assumption that a 'research'
nuclear facility ... could not possibly create environmental and health
concerns (Cook, 1993b).
Cook reports that Large's submission to the Research Reactor
Review stated that a comparison of information supplied by ANSTO with that of overseas nuclear facilities reveals that 'Lucas
Heights discharges far more radioactive waste to the air and water
than larger, more powerful reactors and nuclear plants overseas'
(Cook, 1993b). Cook reports that Large also stated that 'the liquid
and gaseous discharges authorised for discharge from Lucas
Heights were set in the 1960s and were now "many, many times
over the levels of radioactivity which is actually required to be
discharged"' (Cook, 1993b). Furthermore, Cook notes, 'the permitted emission levels would not be approved today with the improved
understanding of safety and management since the 1960's'
(1993b).

Although Cook is apparently sympathetic to the Sutherland Shire
Council's case, her apparent lack of familiarity with contemporary debates about the status of scientific knowledge and how these relate to
issues ofpublic health and safety mean that she is ill-equipped t9 report
the extent and range of the Council's critique of ANSTO's procedures.
These two articles could therefore give the impression that the Council's
critique was similarly informed by an instrumental approach to ANSTO
and its activities, an impression which is not supported by a close reading
ofthe Council's submissions to the Research Reactor Review (Robertson
& Chambers, 1993; Sutherland Shire Council, 1993a, 1993b).

~-
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My earlier contention that the submissions prepared by the Sutherland Shire Council's scientific consultants are informed by an ecological
rationality is supported by the Council's advocacy of the following
procedures within those submissions:
1. Public participation and community right-to--know with regard to
ANSTO's activities (Sutherland Shire Council, 1993a, pp. 8-10).
2. Independent reviews ofANSTO's occupational health and safety,
risk analysis, and environmental pollution (1993a, pp. 3, 5).
3. Incorporation oflocal and worker knowledge of problems related
to the reactor (1993a, p. 4).
4. Comparative assessments of ANSTO's activities with similar
facilities overseas (1993a, pp. 1-3).
5. Peer review by independent consultants in an ongoing process
(l993a, p. 8).
6. Public accountability for ANSTO and the Federal Government
with regard to the Lucas Heights facility (1993a, p. 8).
7. A division of authority between regulators and operators/managers, which does not currently exist (1993a, p. 9).
8. Regular monitoring of emissions by a range of different government departments (l993a, p. 11).
9. Sampling locations should be properly identified, taking into
account activities of residents and the habits of other so-called
'critical groups' (l993a, p. 17).
10. New research on radiation safety should be regularly reviewed
and safety standards adjusted accordingly (1993a, pp. 20-21).
11. A precautionary approach to safety standards should be maintained due to the uncertainties of assessing risks to the public
and ANSTO workers <l993a, p. 21).
Details of these recommendations are included in the Council's submissions.
Although Cook's sympathetic reportage of the Council's submissions
is consistent with her role as environmental reporter, and therefore
acceptable as part of her professional practice, we can see from the
above list that she has failed to adequately cover the range of the
Council's critique of ANSTO's activities. This would appear to have a
great deal to do with the fact that the Sutherland Shire Council is the
only Australian government body to have undertaken an independently-commissioned scientific report on Lucas Heights. Like most
Australianjournalists, Cook is not sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the full ramifications of such a report, and is therefore unable to
present the Council's critique in a coherent way.
In response to the Council's claims, ANSTO's deputy executive director, Professor Helen Garnett was reported to have claimed that 'safety
procedures at Lucas Heights were high and independent scientists in
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Australia and overseas had reviewed the practices' (Cook, 1993a).
Garnett is also said to have claimed that '[dlischarges of radioactive
waste ... were well below the set limits and the nuclear facility posed
no risk to public health'. With regard to the Council's claims that
ANSTO's evacuation procedures were inadequate, Gamett is said to
have responded that she 'could not confirm the accuracy of the council's
claims ... because she had not had time to undertake a full appraisal
ofthe submission'. Gamett was never called upon again to answer these
accusations.
It is instructive to analyse Cook's reportage of Gamett's claims in the
light of the counter-arguments levelled at ANSTO by the Sutherland
Shire Council in response to ANSTO's claims. The protocols ofjournalistic objectivity which have been implemented by Cook within these
reports preclude the possibility ofher analysing Gamett's claims in this
way. Because of these constraints, the article does not tell us that:
(a) some of the independent scientists who conducted reviews of
ANSTO's safety procedures had recommended that ANSTO improve its safety procedures (Quiddington, 1990);
(b) ANSTO's 'set limits' for radioactive waste discharge were 'set' in
the early 1960s by the then Atomic Energy Commission, and
nothing appears to have been done to review them since that time
(Cook, 1993b);
(c) monitoring and testing of some discharge outlets had not been
undertaken for more than ten years (N-waste test is negative,
1993, June 29); and
(d) there is insufficient medical data available in the Sutherland Shire
to establish whether or not there have been any adverse effects on
public health from the reactor, which means that Garnett had no
scientific basis for making that claim <Robinson, 1993).
The only way that SMH readers would be aware of these contradictions is if they had been carefully following the newspaper's reportage
over the last few years.
In the third of Cook's articles dealing with the Sutherland Shire
Council's scientific claims, 'Nuclear reactor risk negligible, ANSTO
says', ANSTO is given virtual carte blanche to answer its critics. Claiming that '[tlhere was less than a one-in-five-million-year [sicl chance of
an accident occurring at the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor t~at was
severe enough to cause injury or death to people living nearby' (Cook,
1993c), ANSTO assures us that 'even ifsuch an accident did occur, there
would be no immediate public injuries or death. Rather, it would
increase the risk of cancer in a person's lifetime. This risk, however,
was one in 500 million' (Cook, 1993c). Thus, we are expected to take
ANSTO's 'expert' risk assessments at face value and to ignore those of
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the overseas consultants, presumably because ANSTO does not recognise their status as 'experts'.
That ANSTO is still permitted to regulate itself and publicly represent government policy on nuclear safety at Lucas Heights is indicative
of the gross conflict of interests first publicly alluded to by the then
Leader of the Opposition, Bill Hayden, in the walre of the Three Mile
Island disaster in 1979 (New body urged, 1979, April 3; O'Reilly, 1993).
ANSTO's 'risk assessments' are, of course, based on sound scientific
data, whereas those of the Council's consultants are merely 'guesstimates', which, according to ANSTO, used terminology 'typical of the
pseudo-technical mumbo-jumbo' (Cook, 1993c). The simple explanation
for these 'guesstimates' is that ANSTO refused to make details of its
safety procedures and monitoring available for public scrutiny either
before, during, or after the time that the Research Reactor Review
required them to make this information available (Robertson & Chambers, 1993; Sutherland Shire Council, 1993a, 1993b). It is thus clearly
evident that ANSTO has total contempt not only for alternative scientific assessments of its operations, but for the public at large, and
appears more than willing to resort to blatant propaganda moves in
order to discredit those who would question its authority.
ANSTO also claimed in Cook's report that it achieved a performance
level '25 times better than the Sellafield facility' (Cook, 1993c), because
people living at the buffer zone of Lucas Heights only received a
'potential effective dose' of 0.01 millisieverts, as opposed to 0.25 roillisieverts for people living close to Sellafield. However, Cook's article
does not explain that:
(a) the HlFAR reactor is only a 20 megawatt facility, whereas Sellafield has four 50 megawatt reactors (that is, it is one-tenth the
size of Sellafield);
(b) Sellafield is a reprocessing plant, whereas Lucas Heights is a
research reactor;
(c) the buffer zone surrounding Sellafield is somewhat less than that
surrounding Lucas Heights; and
(d) there is still a raging controversy over 'acceptable' levels of radiation exposure.
Thus, we can see that even according to its own criteria of technical
evidence, ANSTO has grossly misrepresented itself to the public,
'massaging' the figures to put itself in the most favourable light. This
article also demonstrates that ANSTO has no qualms about resorting
to its own form of 'pseudo-technical mumbo-jumbo' whenever it feels
that the situation warrants it. Because ofthe constraints and protocols
surrounding such reportage, Cook is only able to present the information provided by ANSTO without criticising it. Such constraints do,
however, highlight the difficulties of providing balanced reporting of
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scientific controversies when the conflict is constructed around the
contentious technical claims made by scientific experts representing
different scientific rationalities.

Conclusion
In the 8MB's framing of the Lucas Heights controversy, a number of
formative influences stand out. Firstly, most of the 8MH journalists
who have covered the controversy do not have an adequate grasp ofthe
wider political situation surrounding nuclear technology, nor do they
understand the competing rationalities and the various scientific approaches adopted by the different disputants to buttress their respective positions. However, this is not surprising in a political and
economic climate which actively discourages such a critical attitude in
the mainstream media.
The fact that more than thirty different 8MH journalists have contributed articles on different aspects ofthe Lucas Heights controversy
over the last six years compounds these inadequacies, and gives some
idea ofthe fragmented nature ofthe 8MB's reporting. The way in which
the 8MH has handled the controversy is symptomatic of the usual
on-again, off-again, nature of mainstream media coverage of controversial public health issues. The attention span of most of the journalists
involved does not seem to last more than six months and, in many cases,
articles on the controversy were simply 'on~ff$'. Most of the reports
were simply responding to press releases from ANSTO, the Sutherland
Shire Council, or State or Federal Governments. A few were in response
to leaked government documents; some others were initiated as 'factfinding' 'vox-pop' articles. Only a very small number of the journalists
involved, including Cook <and occasionally the 8MB's science reporter
Richard Macey), seem to have had the patience and fortitude to regularly 'do the rounds' by staying in touch with key players in the controversy. Indeed, it is only amongst this relatively small number of
journalists that anything approaching the norm ofjournalistic objectivity has been in evidence.
The second formative influence on the reporting of the controversy is
the powerfully persuasive instrumental rationality that serves as the
basis oflegitimacy for the 8MH, the Federal Government, and ANSTO.
Because the 'logic' which serves these three institutions is essentially
in harmony, questions of legitimacy directed against the government
and ANSTO eventually find some form of defence from the 8MH. The
consistently positive press that the 8MH has been giving Indonesia
since March, combined with the lack of reporting about the Federal
Government's recent nuclear activities in that country, suggests that
some kind ofeditorial intervention has been occurring. This observation
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is further supported by the uncritical stance taken by the SMH's editor,
D.J. Hickie, on Lucas Heights and the expansion ofAustralia's uranium
exports. However, as always, such intervention is difficult to establish
conclusively.
According to Jones, CollOell, and Meadows (1971), science is usually
only reported in the newspapers when it touches on issues of general
social interest. Usually these reports focus on the moral and ethical
questions raised by such issues, with a fair degree of suspicion and
criticism brought to bear. While the mainstream media does have a
tendency to present scientific issues in a fairly ambivalent manner
when it comes to their ethical and social implications, it should be
acknowledged that the instrumental aspects of science, that is, 'the
curative powers of medicine and the use of technology in both industry
and government' (Jones et al. p. 6), are frequently called upon within
scientific controversies to reinforce the ultimate authority and impartiality of science as the 'deliverer of the goods', that is, as the practical
saviour of humanity through technological progress. Of the seventy or
more articles on Lucas Heights which have been published in the SMH
over the last six years, at least eighteen of them have fulfilled this
instrumental role (see Appendix). They have always appeared at strategic moments within the controversy, thus serving to buttress the
legitimacy of the government and its scientific authorities when it
appeared that 'the bad press' may be getting out ofhand and undermining public confidence in science.
The third formative influence on the SMHs reporting of the controversy is the Sutherland Shire Council's campaign against a new reactor,
in concert with the environmental lobby. Although the Council has so
far been successful at stalling HlFAR's replacement, they have not been
successful at forcing a reorganisation of ANSTO's safety procedures.
Nor have they managed to draw the public's attention to the Federal
Government's duplicity with regard to international nuclear issues. It
conld even be argued that Councillor Genevieve Rankin's calls for Lucas
Heights to be closed down are unrealistic, especially given the'international diplomacy' role that the government has planned for ANSTO.1t
could also be argued that such a strategy has actually diverted attention
from the far more important tasks of setting up a genuinely independent scientific and administrative body to oversee nuclear safety
procedures within Australia, and ensuring that the Federal Government withdraws its support for nuclear power technology for our Asian
neighbours.
Finally, many ofthe problems associated with dealing with scientific
controversies in the media derive from the perpetuation ofinappropriate and antiquated myths about the nature ofscience in modern society.
Most of the notions of certainty, objectivity, and rationality subscribed
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to by the media and the legal and political systems actually stem from
these inappropriate and antiquated myths about science. To quote Edge
(1985):
... [this situation] only compounds the difficulty of the task ahead ofus,
for to attempt to displace these conventional ideologies and myths ... is
to tamper with the legitimation of powerful vested interests, not only in
science, but in society at large. Ideas about the nature of science are but
one aspect of modem political rhetoric, and chSDlll's in the structure and
exercise of power and authority in society - in other words, political
changes - are a necessary precondition for their effective reform (p. 17).
It is hoped that studies such as this, as well as a growing body of
research in the sociology of science (Shapin & Schaffer, 1986; Latour,
1986,1987,1990; Latour, Mauguin, & Teil, 1992), are able to demonstrate that despite postmodern and popular misoonceptions, it is, after
all, not the force of the better argument which wins out in the end, but
rather, that the 'better' argument wins by force - a truism which, if we
are to believe Latour, applies as much to science as it does to politics.
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Appendix
The following articles were published in the SMH at strategic moments
within the Lucas Heights controversy, and appear to have served the instrumental purpose of 'damage control' for ANSTO and the Federal Government. It
would also appear to be no coincidence that half ofthese articles appeared after
the Research Reactor Review was announced, and most ofthose in two clusters:

i •'

one in the immediate lead up to the March 1993 federal election, and the other
in the lead up to the announcement of the Research Reactor Review's findings
on 5 August 1993. A more detailed graphic plot of these articles within the
SMH's overall reportage ofthe controversy is available from the author.
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